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1Eric T. Olson
In Philosophia Christi 20, 2018: 21-29.
  Richard Swinburne argues that if my cerebral hemispheres were each
transplanted into a different head, what would happen to me is not determined by
my material parts, and I must therefore have an immaterial part.  The paper argues
that this argument relies on modal claims that Swinburne has not established.  And
the means he proposes for establishing such claims cannot succeed.
   Absolute possibility; Logical possibility; modal epistemology;
substance dualism; Richard Swinburne
Substance dualism is the view that we are immaterial substances--beings not
made of physical stuff.  Or maybe we are each composed of both a thinking,
immaterial substance and a material thing--a “soul” and a “body”--and thus only
partly immaterial.  The difference is unimportant for present purposes.1
Richard Swinburne’s most recent argument for substance dualism (2018) is
based on an imaginary operation in which my cerebral hemispheres are separated
and each transplanted into a different head from which both original hemispheres
have been removed.  The result is two people, each psychologically continuous
with me as I was previously.
Swinburne says it is possible for me to go with the left transplanted hemisphere:
to survive as the person whose body is the organism the left hemisphere becomes
a part of.  It is also possible for me to go with the right hemisphere:  to be the person
who ends up with that organ.  And it is possible that after the operation I am neither
of these people:  I might cease to exist, become disembodied, or perhaps stay
behind with an empty head.
Further, he says, all these outcomes are possible even if the nature and
arrangement of matter is the same.  It’s not that I could go with the left hemisphere
only if some unique brain part necessary for important cognitive abilities were
located within that organ, and I could go with the right hemisphere only if that part
were located there instead.  There are possible worlds where I go with the left
hemisphere, and worlds where the nature and arrangement of matter throughout
the whole of space and time are identical, yet I do not go with the left hemisphere.
The facts about matter do not determine what happens to me.
This entails substance dualism, Swinburne says, given that the identity and
persistence of a thing must be fixed by the nature and arrangement of its parts.
Necessarily, if an object has a certain career--if it exists for a certain period and has
certain things as parts at various times--then those parts’ having the same nature
1Though it matters in other ways:  see Olson 2007: 168-171.
2and arrangement at those times entails that that object exists and has the same
career.  A thing could have a different career, or fail to exist at all, only if its parts
differed:  if some of the things that are in fact parts of it at a given time were not parts
of it then, or things that are not parts of it were parts of it, or some of its parts had a
different nature or arrangement.  Swinburne calls this the principle of the identity of
composites.
It implies that there must be a difference in my parts to account for the difference
between my going with my left hemisphere and my not going with it in Swinburne’s
operation.  And as there is by hypothesis no difference in my material parts, it must
be a difference in my immaterial parts.  Swinburne concludes that I must therefore
have an immaterial part.  This part can either become “attached” to the left
hemisphere so that I survive as the person who ends up with that organ, or not, so
that I do not survive as that person.  We could summarize the argument like this:
1.  It is possible for me to go with my left hemisphere and also possible for me not to
go with it, without any difference in my material parts.
2.  It is not possible for a thing’s career to differ without a difference in its parts; so
3.  I must have an immaterial part.
As stated, the conclusion of this argument does not follow from its premises.  It is
consistent with the premises that I have no immaterial part, as long as I could have
had one.  Were that so, this part could either attach itself to the transplanted left
hemisphere so that I went with that organ, or not, without any difference in my
matter.  What happens to me would still be fixed by what happens to my parts.  But I
need not actually have any immaterial part.2
The argument needs to rule out the possibility that the first premise is true not
because I have such a part, but merely because I could have had one.  We could
do this by adding the premise that if a thing is wholly material, it could not have had
an immaterial part:  the “principle of essential materiality”.  It follows that whatever
could have an immaterial part actually has one, enabling us to rewrite the argument
like this:
1.  It is possible for me to go with my left hemisphere and also possible for me not
to, without any difference in my material parts.
2.  It is not possible for a thing’s career to differ without a difference in its parts; so
3*.  It is possible for me to have an immaterial part.
2Suppose there are three possible worlds.  In the first I have an immaterial part and
go with the left transplanted hemisphere.  In the second I have an immaterial part
and go with the right hemisphere.  The nature and arrangement of matter in these
worlds is identical.  In the third--the actual world--I have no immaterial part.  That
makes the premises true and the conclusion false.
34.  If it is possible for a thing to have an immaterial part, it has one.  Thus,
5.  I have an immaterial part.
But Swinburne informs me that he rejects the principle of essential materiality,
and thus 4.  We might say instead that no wholly material thing could have had an
immaterial thinking part or soul--the sort of part that would enable it to go with either
transplanted hemisphere.  My having an unthinking immaterial part “attach itself” to
my transplanted left hemisphere (whatever that might mean) would not make it the
case that I went with that organ.  Unthinking immaterial parts would have no
bearing on my persistence.  And although a thing could have an unthinking
immaterial part accidentally, whatever has a thinking immaterial part must have one
essentially.  Call this the “principle of essential ensoulment”.  In that case the
possibility of my going with the left hemisphere or not, without any difference in my
matter, would require me actually to have a soul.
This is presumably what Swinburne had in mind:  he wants to show not just that
I have an immaterial part, but that I have a soul.  (That’s what everyone means by
substance dualism.)  But it complicates matters.  We cannot simply replace
‘immaterial part’ with ‘immaterial thinking part’ in the revised argument:  3*, thus
amended, would not follow from 1 and 2.  Further premises are needed:  that there
could be souls, for one, and that having a soul would enable someone to go with
her transplanted hemisphere or not without any difference in her matter, whereas
having an unthinking immaterial part would not.  Swinburne has not argued for
these further premises, and there is nothing obvious about them.  Because I am
interested in the features this more complex argument shares with the simpler one
(1-5), however, I will set these further claims aside.
The simpler argument contains modal premises of two sorts:  one about what is
possible and two about what is impossible.  (4 says that if a thing has no immaterial
part--or soul--it is impossible for it to have one.)  Suppose we grant the premises
about what is impossible.  Why should we accept that I could go with my left
hemisphere or not without any difference in my matter?
Swinburne says that this is logically possible.  He defines logical possibilities as
those discoverable “by mere reflection on the meaning of the sentence” (2012: 16,
MS).  More precisely, a sentence is logically possible just if it entails no
contradiction--where one sentence entails another just if we cannot understand
both without seeing that affirming the first commits us to affirming the second (or
there is a chain of such “mini-entailments” leading from the first to the second)
(2012: 17-19, MS).  So he is saying that it is not possible to derive a contradiction
by reflecting on the meaning of any sentence of the form ‘I go [do not go] with my
transplanted left hemisphere and the nature and arrangement of the matter is thus
and so’.
4He’s right about that.  At least I can’t see how to do it.  But Swinburne accepts
that not all logical possibilities are absolutely or metaphysically possible (2012: 19,
MS).  It is logically possible in his sense for gold to have atomic number 42, or for
Hesperus to be distinct from Phosphorus, or for me to be the secret love child of
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.  None of these claims entails a
contradiction.  Yet they are absolutely impossible if anything is.
(This shows that Swinburne’s “logical possibility” is not really a species of
possibility.  To say that something is logically possible is just to say that it is not
ruled out on logical grounds.  It is like calling the existence of round squares
“arithmetically possible” because it is not ruled out on arithmetical grounds.  Or
suppose the infallible Encyclopedia of Fungi describes some mushrooms as edible
and some as inedible, and is silent about the rest (see van Inwagen 2001: 247f.).  It
would be only gallows humor to call those not described as inedible
“encyclopedically edible”:  it would be compatible with their being deadly
poisonous.  Being logically possible is a way of being possible only insofar as
being encyclopedically edible is a way of being edible.  This is not to say that there
is anything wrong with Swinburne’s concept of logical possibility--or with the
concept of encyclopedic edibility.  My point is only that they are badly named and
thus liable to mislead.)
Swinburne does not take the word ‘possible’ in the transplant argument to mean
‘logically possible’.  If nothing else, that would imply that we could derive a
contradiction from the claim that a thing’s career might differ without a difference in
its parts, or that a thing lacking an immaterial part (or a soul) could have one.  And
no one has ever shown how to do this.3  The argument must assert that it is
absolutely or metaphysically possible for me to go with my left hemisphere or not
without any difference in my matter.
How are we to know whether this is the case?  Swinburne’s answer is that when
a sentence is logically but not absolutely possible, this is because it contains
“uninformative designators”:  terms whose meaning we can know without knowing
the criteria for applying them to objects (2012: 19-21, MS).  For example, few of
those who know the meaning of the word ‘gold’ know what makes something gold,
as opposed to any other shiny yellow metal.  An “informative designator”, by
contrast, is one where knowing its meaning implies knowing the criteria for
applying it to objects.  An informative designator might express what Locke called
the “real essence” of something--what makes it the thing it is--whereas an
3Swinburne says, “we can all see that it is logically impossible” for a thing’s career
to vary without a difference in its parts (2018).  But this is false:  I, for one, cannot
see it.  And he says nothing about how to derive a contradiction from it.  (I am not
saying that the statement is metaphysically possible--only that no one has shown it
to be logically impossible.)
5uninformative designator expresses only the superficial “nominal essence” by
which we typically recognize it.  ‘The element whose atoms have 79 protons’ would
presumably be an informative designator referring to the same substance as ‘gold’.
If so, then on Swinburne’s view we can show that the sentence ‘gold has atomic
number 42’ is absolutely impossible by replacing ‘gold’ with the co-referential
informative designator ‘the element whose atoms have 42 protons’.  This yields a
sentence that is logically impossible in his sense:  anyone who knows the meaning
of ‘atomic number’ will see that attributing to an element the atomic number 42
commits one to affirming that its atoms have 42 protons and not 79.
In general, a sentence is absolutely possible just if no replacement of any term
in it with a co-referential informative designator yields a logically impossible
sentence.  (Or at least this is so if the designators are “rigid”, referring to the same
thing in all possible situations--‘gold’ or ‘the element with atomic number 79’, for
example, and not ‘the most expensive commodity sold at the Chicago Board of
Trade’.)  So any absolutely impossible sentence can be turned into a logically
impossible one by appropriate substitution of co-referential terms.  Call this
Swinburne’s principle of absolute possibility.
I cannot see how this principle could be true.  Consider the elementary particles
here where I am.  Many philosophers say that they now compose something:  me,
according to materialists, my body according to dualists--where by definition the xs
compose y (at a time) just if each of the xs is a part of y, no two of the xs share a
part, and every part of y shares a part with one or more of the xs (at that time).  More
precisely, they now compose just one thing.  But some say that they compose two:
myself and my body (Shoemaker 1984: 112-114, Baker 2000).  My body is no
larger or smaller than I am--we are made of just the same matter--yet we have
different persistence conditions:  only I persist by virtue of some sort of
psychological continuity.  Or the particles might also compose a third thing:  a
“mass of matter”, which, unlike myself or my body, must always be composed of
those atoms.  Or they might compose more than three things.  A few say that the
particles compose nothing:  no larger object has them as parts.4
One of these statements, and only one, must be true:  the particles now
compose nothing, or they now compose one thing, or two, or some other number.
The definition of ‘compose’ makes the statements exclusive and exhaustive--just as
‘zero’, ‘one’, ‘two’, and ‘some other number’ are exhaustive and exclusive accounts
of how many children I have.  But no one has ever succeeded in transforming any
of these statements into something logically impossible in Swinburne’s sense by
substitution of co-referential terms, and not for want of trying.  There are plenty of
reasons to dismiss the claim that these particles now compose exactly seventeen
things:  it is absurdly implausible; it is wholly unprincipled; we could never know it
even if it were true.  But there is no logical objection to it.  It appears to follow from
Swinburne’s principle of absolute possibility that these claims about composition
4The classic discussion of this topic is van Inwagen 1990.
6are all metaphysically possible and it is a contingent matter which one is true.  No
one would accept that.  This is no isolated case:  there appears to be no logical
objection to the claim that there are universals, for example, or to the claim that
there are not; but again, no one thinks that these are both metaphysically possible.
But suppose we grant Swinburne’s principle.  Applied to the transplant
argument, it says we could establish that it really is possible for me to go with my
left hemisphere or not, with no difference in my material parts, if we could show that
no substitution of co-referential informative designators in the relevant sentences
yields a logically impossible sentence.  Conversely, we could show that this is not
possible by providing a substitution that does yield something logically impossible.
Can we do either of these things?  Well, I believe that the word ‘me’ (or ‘I’) in my
mouth is co-referential with something like ‘the thinker of these thoughts that is an
organism and whose persistence consists in sameness of biological life’5--which, I
suppose, is an informative designator in Swinburne’s sense.  (This is of course not
to say that they have the same meaning.)  And the sentence ‘The thinker of these
thoughts that is a biological organism and whose persistence consists in sameness
of biological life goes with his transplanted left hemisphere’ is logically impossible--
given the fact, implicit in the story, that the person who ends up with that organ
would not have my biological life.  If this is right, it would follow by Swinburne’s
principle that it is absolutely impossible for me to go with my left hemisphere.
Now I have given no argument for this belief of mine, and I don’t expect readers
to share it.  Swinburne will deny that my proposed designator refers to the same
thing as ‘me’, or to anything else, because he believes that no organism can think
(see the next section).  My point is not that I’m right and he’s wrong, but that it’s hard
to know.  Does the word ‘me’ in my mouth refer to something that can either go with
its left hemisphere or not, without any difference in its matter, or does it refer to an
organism?  For the transplant argument to have any force, there must be a reason
to prefer the first over the second--a reason that we could have without already
knowing whether we are material or immaterial.  Swinburne has not provided one.
I cannot see how to establish what could happen to me in Swinburne’s
operation by the method of substituting co-referential terms and looking for
contradictions.  But never mind.  Could we not establsh it simply on the basis of
“modal intuition”?  It seems genuinely possible to many people that I could go with
my left hemisphere or not in the operation, without any difference in my matter--just
as it seems possible to everyone that my chair could have been nearer the wall.
This is not the conclusion of any argument, but the way it appears before we give
any arguments.  And it may be rational to accept what seems to be the case in the
absence of reasons not to accept it.
The trouble with this proposal is that modal intuitions are prone to clash.  For
5For details see van Inwagen 1990: 83-97, 142-168
7example, it seems to many people possible--really possible--for a wholly material
thing to think.  And if any such thing could ever think, the organism responsible for
these words would be thinking right now.  It would be thinking my thoughts.  But
whatever thinks my thoughts is me.  (No one would suppose that my thoughts have
two thinkers, one wholly material and one partly or wholly immaterial.)  So if a
wholly material thing were thinking these thoughts, it would be me.  The possibility
that a wholly material thing could think leads, by steps that no one will dispute, to
the conclusion that I could be wholly material.
Swinburne must deny that this is possible:  otherwise it would follow by the
principle of essential materiality that I actually am wholly material (or by the
principle of essential ensoulment that I have no soul).  His claim about what could
happen in the transplant operation entails, by his own lights, that it is absolutely
impossible for any wholly material thing to think.  He presumably takes the
appearance that it is possible for me to go with my left hemisphere or not without
any difference in my matter to undermine the claim that a material thing could think.
Others will reason in the opposite way, taking the appearance that a material thing
could think to undermine Swinburne’s claim about brain transplants.  Disputes of
this sort are notoriously hard to adjudicate.  How are we to know which side (if
either) is right?  If our only evidence is modal intuition--holding states of affairs
before the mind and trying to perceive which are possible--it doesn’t look as if we
can know.  The competing intuitions simply “cancel each other out”6.
But modal intuition is not our only evidence.  The reason I believe that I could be
wholly material is not that I can perceive this possibility a priori, but that there are
strong empirical grounds for my actually being wholly material.7  If I were partly or
wholly immaterial--in particular, if I were conscious by having a conscious
immaterial part--then we should expect damage to my body to disrupt the
interaction of these two objects, much as damage to a remote-control aircraft can
affect our ability to operate it.  A blow to the head might make me unable to move or
to perceive anything.  But the immaterial thing would be undamaged, and so ought
to continue functioning and remain fully conscious.  Yet that’s not what happens.
Damage to the brain, or general anaesthesia, knocks you out cold.  We also know
that differences in the brain are systematically correlated with differences in
cognitive and perceptual abilities, alertness, mood, memory, and other mental
phenomena.
By far the best explanation of these familiar facts is that mental activities are
physical processes in the brain.  It is the opposite of what we should expect if they
were nonphysical processes in an immaterial substance.  (Dualists say it shows
only that soul and body interact.  But if an immaterial substance cannot produce
thought without the body’s help, what could it mean to say that it thinks?  Why not
7This sort of reasoning is commonplace.  My formulation is from van Inwagen
(1993: 178-80).
6I borrow this phrase from van Inwagen (2001: 245).
8say instead that the body thinks with the soul’s help?)  It looks as if my thinking
does not take place in an immaterial part, and thus that I have none.  And as what is
actual is possible, it follows that I could be wholly material.
This is of course not decisive.  But what is there to set against it?  What reason
have we to suppose that I could go with my left hemisphere or not without any
difference in my matter?  The modal intuition that it’s possible is canceled out by the
intuition that a material thing could think.  There remains only the fact that
Swinburne claims to know it.  But he has not yet been able to transfer this
knowledge to the rest of us.  Until that happens, the evidence favors the claim that I
could be wholly material over his claim about what could happen in brain
transplants--assuming, as the other premises of his argument imply, that these
things cannot both be possible.8
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